CHAPTER: "Permanent Neutrality or Permanent Insecurity? Obligation and Self-Interest in the Defence of Belgian Neutrality, 1830–1870" (in: Inge VAN HULLE & Randall LESAFFER (eds.), International Law in the Long Nineteenth Century (1776-1914). From the Public Law of Europe to Global International Law ? [Legal History Library, 28; Studies in the History of International Law, 11] (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff/Brill, 2019), pp. 159-185, ISBN 9789004391147

(image source: Brill)

Abstract:

The permanent or compulsory nature of Belgian neutrality, from the country’s inception (1830–1839) to the Franco-Prussian war (1870) is has generally been left to political or diplomatic historians. The guarantors of Belgian independence had made their enduring support conditional on the respect of the obligations of neutrality. Legal historians should consider that political and diplomatic exchanges were steeped in international law-discourse. In early modern doctrine, a state’s decision to remain neutral during a conflict between third states could be reversed when necessary. The permanent nature of these restrictions meant the latter had become impossible. The Belgian government pleaded for a restrictive reading of limitations to its sovereignty. Rights and obligations were presented as mutually dependent. This played out favourably during the ‘War of the Triple Alliance’ (1864–1870), exports to Brazil could go on, even if its opponent, Paraguay suffered a blockade. Franco-British pressure forced the Belgian government to downplay its ambitions in 1854, during the Crimean War. Even if arms were supplied to all parties in the conflict. When guarantors were involved in a conflict, neutrality became a nearly prohibitive burden. British sympathy for the Belgian liberal constitutional system could not override basic geopolitical interests and French pressure.

Read more on the Brill website (DOI 10.1163/9789004412088_009).

ARTICLE: "Neutralité permanente, interprétations mutantes: la neutralité belge à travers trois traités de juristes", Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis/Revue d'Histoire du Droit/The Legal History Review LXXXVI (2018), nr. 1-2, pp. 188-214

(image source: Brill)

Abstract:

The permanent neutrality imposed on Belgium by the great powers (1830-1839) seems a precursor of a system of mandatory arbitration and the outlawing of war. At least, this image transpires in the writings of Ernest Nys (1903) and Edouard Descamps (1902), prominent voices of the ‘Gentle Civilizer of Nations’. Sixty years earlier, geopolitical circumstance, state practice and classical law of nations doctrine had brought Wilhelm Arendt (1845) to a more prudent point of view. The confrontation of both strands in doctrine with Belgian policy shows a complex sui generis combination of pragmatism and genuine fear of the guarantors’ wrath.  

DOI 10.1163/15718190-08612P09

CALL FOR PAPERS Training, Ideas and Practices. The Law of Nations in the Long Eighteenth Century (Paris, 18-19 May 2017); DEADLINE 20 FEBRUARY 2017

CALL FOR PAPERS

Training, Ideas and Practices. The Law of Nations in the Long Eighteenth Century 

(Paris, 18-19 May 2017)

The purpose of this conference is to explore the roots of international law and the various concepts related to the “law of nations” by looking at the legal language of diplomats and foreign offices in Europe during the long eighteenth century. The conference also aims to render the variety and complexity of specific mechanisms through which the law of nations was applied for diplomatic use, to explore social and cultural aspects, and to investigate the practical questions that diplomats frequently faced (N. Drocourt & E. Schnakenbourg (eds.), Thémis en diplomatie, PURennes, 2016).

The relationship between diplomacy and the law of nations is at best ambiguous. On the one hand, the law of nations seems to be a hybrid product of philosophical concepts and a digest of diplomatic practice. Lawyers have difficulty resisting the temptation to write a purely academic or genealogical history of the law of nations. The frequent invocation of authors such as Vattel as an authority seems to support this (P. Haggenmacher  & V. Chetail (eds.), Vattel’s International Law from a XXIst Century Perspective, Brill, 2011). On the other hand, interaction in negotiations involves a lot more than invoked legal principles. A thorough analysis of diplomatic practice often reveals implicit rules within diplomacy as a social field  (P. Bourdieu, Sur l’Etat, Seuil, 2012). Legal arguments are a part of this microcosm, but geopolitical determinants and state interests can bend and bow the use of legal language.

One of the main issues of this conference will be  whether law of nations theories influenced diplomatic practice and at the same time whether diplomatic practice altered traditional law of nations concepts. Through fruitful dialogue between young legal historians, historians of political thought and historians of politics from France, Germany and other parts of Europe, we would like to explore and investigate three different scenarios in which law of nations theories emerged both in the practice and the doctrine of diplomacy:

1)      Training of diplomats 

Was the law of nations the basis of diplomatic education? Did diplomats also receive specific, in-house, foreign affairs training? Was it only theoretical or also based on practice and experience? Was there already a form of professionalisation of diplomats, especially in view of later developments in the 19^th century (L. Nuzzo & M. Vec (dir.), Constructing International Law – The Birth of a Discipline, V. Klostermann, 2012)? Finally, to what extent can we envisage a common European diplomatic culture? 

2)      Circulation of ideas and diplomatic networks

What was the legal and intellectual background of the various traités du droit des gens? To what extent were legal expertise (G. Braun, La connaissance du Saint-Empire en France du baroque aux Lumières (1643-1756), De Gruyter, 2010) or legal rhetorics pragmatic tools used in everyday politics? For whom did thinkers such as Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743) write their treatises? The sovereign? Legal advisers? Public opinion?  If the law of nations formed a kind of a common European diplomatic culture, how did it spread throughout Europe? Can we identify the same use in various diplomatic flows of the time? How were diplomatic networks organised?  Can we find examples of specific territories - such as the principalities of Walachia and Moldova, between the Ottoman Empire and the “European” powers – functioning as kinds of “diplomatic hubs”?  

3)      Transformation 

Is the diplomatic habitus of the Vienna Congress a turning point?  Where did the transition from the 18^th to the 19^th century take place, both in theory and in practice? How important was the impact of Enlightenment and French Revolutionary thought (M. Bélissa,  Fraternité universelle et intérêt national, 1713-1795, Kimé, 1998)? How far can we find echoes in diplomatic culture and correspondence? 

We kindly invite young scholars (up to 6 years after PhD) to present their new research within French-German and European perspectives. All applications must be sent by 20 February 2017 with a short CV (5 to 10 lines) and a proposal of 400 words to diplomacyconference2017@gmail.com. Results will be communicated by 15 March 2017.  This conference has received the generous support of the CIERA (Centre interdisciplinaire d'études et de recherches sur l'Allemagne, www.ciera.fr) as a colloque junior and will take place on the 18^th (afternoon) and 19^th (morning) of May 2017.  

Papers can be presented in English, French or German. A peer-reviewed publication of the proceedings is envisaged.

Organising Committee

Raphael Cahen (Orléans/VUB-FWO)

Frederik Dhondt (VUB/Antwerp/Ghent-FWO)

Elisabetta Fiocchi Malaspina 

Scientific Committee

Jacques Bouineau (La Rochelle)

Paul De Hert (VUB)

Dirk Heirbaut (Ghent)

Christine Lebeau (Paris I)

Gabriella Silvestrini (Piemonte Orientale)

Matthias Schmoeckel (Bonn)

Antonio Trampus (Venezia)

Miloš Vec (Vienna)

APPEL À CONTRIBUTIONS

Formation, idées et pratique. Le droit des gens dans le long dix-huitième siècle

(Paris, 18-19 mai 2017)

Les origines du droit international et les divers concepts du « droit des gens » seront au cœur d’une rencontre scientifique, portant sur l’étude du langage juridique des diplomates et des chancelleries européennes pendant le long dix-huitième siècle. Les mécanismes d’application spécifiques à travers lesquels le droit des gens fut invoqué pour une utilisation diplomatique ne se conçoivent pas en dehors des aspects culturels et sociaux, ou des problèmes pratiques que les diplomates avaient à trancher (N. Drocourt & E. Schnakenbourg (dir.), Thémis en diplomatie, PU Rennes, 2016).

                La relation entre la diplomatie et le droit des gens est ambiguë. D’une part, le droit des gens semble un produit hybride de concepts philosophiques et une cristallisation de pratique diplomatique. Les juristes peinent à résister la tentation d’écrire une histoire purement académique ou généalogique du droit des gens. L’invocation fréquente d’auteurs tels que Vattel en est une indication courante (P. Haggenmacher & V. Chetail (dir.), Vattel’s International Law from a XXIst Century Perspective, Brill, 2011). Néanmoins, l’interaction de la négociation entraîne bien plus qu’une invocation de principes juridiques. Une analyse rigoureuse de la pratique diplomatique révèle des règles implicites au sein de la diplomatie comme champ social (P. Bourdieu, Sur l’Etat, Seuil, 2012). L’argumentation juridique relève de ce microcosme et doit donc être apprécié dans une sociabilité qui transcende les traditions juridiques nationales (L. Bély, L’art de la paix en Europe : naissance de la diplomatie moderne, XVIe-XVIIIe siècle, PUF, 2007). Toutefois, les déterminants géopolitiques et les intérêts d’État peuvent amender ou infléchir l’utilisation d’arguments juridiques.

                Une question centrale sera d’essayer de savoir si les théories du droit des gens ont influé la pratique diplomatique, et si de son côté la pratique diplomatique a réussi à changer les concepts traditionnels du droit des gens. Un échange fructueux entre jeunes historiens du droit, historiens de la pensée politique et historiens « du politique » de France, d’Allemagne et d’autres traditions intellectuelles européennes permettra d’explorer trois scénarios différents à travers lesquels les théories du droit des gens émergeaient aussi bien en pratique qu’en doctrine diplomatique.

1)      Formation des diplomates

Le droit des gens constituait-il le cœur de la formation diplomatique ? Qu’en fut-il des enseignements pratiques, organisés par les administrations étatiques des affaires étrangères ? Quel était le rapport entre les connaissances tirées de l’objet même de la négociation (la pratique) et celle dérivée des écrits qui font autorité dans nos traditions scientifiques ? Pouvait-on vraiment parler de professionnalisation, également eu égard aux développements du XIXe (L. Nuzzo & M. Vec (dir.), Constructing International Law – The Birth of a Discipline, V. Klostermann, 2012) ? Finalement, qu’en fut-il du caractère commun ou européen de la culture diplomatique des divers corps ?

2)      Circulation des idées et réseaux diplomatiques

Les traités dévoués au droit des gens sont souvent étudiés en isolement, hors contexte, dans leur lignée intellectuelle ou académique. Cependant, qu’en fut-il de leur utilisation pratique ou de celle de l’expertise juridique plus générale (G. Braun, La connaissance du Saint-Empire en France du baroque aux Lumières (1643-1756), De Gruyter, 2010), comme outil rhétorique dans la politique quotidienne ? À qui s’adressaient les traités de penseurs comme l’abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743) ? Le souverain, ou bien ses conseillers juridiques, ou bien l’opinion de la république des lettres ? Si le droit des gens constituait une sorte de culture diplomatique européenne commune, comment se diffusait-elle sur le continent ? Peut-on identifier des usages similaires dans les flux diplomatiques ? Comment les réseaux s’organisaient-ils ? Peut-on identifier des carrefours diplomatiques, tels que les principautés de Valachie et Moldavie, entre l’Empire Ottoman et les puissances européennes ?

3)      Transformation

Le Congrès de Vienne (1815) fut-il vraiment un tournant pour le droit des gens ? Si nous pouvons identifier une transition, relève-t-elle de la doctrine juridique ou plutôt des idées politiques ? À quel degré la pensée des Lumières et de la Révolution a-t-elle impacté le droit des gens classique (M. Bélissa, Fraternité universelle et intérêt national, 1713-1795, Kimé, 1998) ? Dans quelle mesure la correspondance diplomatique en fut-elle le témoin ?

Nous invitons les jeunes chercheurs (jusqu’à six ans après soutenance de la thèse de doctorat) à présenter leurs recherches nouvelles, dans une perspective franco-allemande et européenne. Les propositions doivent être envoyées pour le 20 février 2017 au plus tard, accompagnées d’un CV concis (5 à 10 lignes) et d’un résumé de 400 mots au maximum (diplomacyconference2017@gmail.com). Les résultats seront communiqués pour le 15 mars 2017 au plus tard.

La conférence a reçu le soutien du CIERA (Centre interdisciplinaire d’études et de recherches sur l’Allemagne, www.ciera.fr) en tant que colloque junior. Elle aura lieu à Paris, le 18 mai 2017 (à la Maison de la Recherche), et le 19 mai 2017 (Fondation Biermans-Lapôtre, Cité Internationale Universitaire de Paris). Les contributions peuvent être présentées en anglais, français ou allemand. Les frais de déplacement et d'hébergement pourront être pris en charge sous certaines conditions. Une publication soumise au contrôle des pairs est envisagée.

Comité organisateur
Raphael Cahen (VUB-FWO/Orléans-POLEN)
Frederik Dhondt (VUB/Anvers/Gand-FWO)
Elisabetta Fiocchi Malaspina

Comité scientifiqueJacques Bouineau (La Rochelle)Paul De Hert (VUB)
Dirk Heirbaut (Gand)
Christine Lebeau (Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne)
Gabriella Silvestrini (Piemonte Orientale)
Matthias Schmoeckel (Bonn)
Antonio Trampus (Venise)
Miloš Vec (Vienne)

ARTICLE: "The Law of Nations and Declarations of War after the Peace of Utrecht", History of European Ideas XLII (2016), pp. 329-349 (ISSN 0191-6599) - Published online (Taylor&Francis/Routledge)

 (image source: Taylor&Francis)

Taylor & Francis/Routledge just published the online version of my forthcoming article "The Law of Nations and Declarations of War after the Peace of Utrecht", History of European Ideas XLII (2016), pp. 329-349.

DOI: 10.1080/01916599.2015.1118333.

Abstract:

The history of the law of nations is generally seen as a synonym for the history of the laws of war. Yet, a strictly bilateral perspective can distort our interpretation of early modern diplomacy. The Peace of Utrecht (11 April 1713) inaugurated an era of relative stability in the European state system, based on balance-of-power politics and anti-hegemonic legal argumentation. Incidental conflicts ought to be interpreted against this background. Declarations of war issued in 1718, 1719 and 1733 during the War of the Quadruple Alliance and the Polish Succession should not be read as doctrinal surrogates for trials between two parties, but as manifestos in a European arena.

 More information on the Taylor & Francis website.

(see also the announcement on the Ghent Rolin Jaequemyns Institute for International Law's website)

NEW WORKING PAPER ONLINE: "Arrestez et pillez contre toute sorte de droit: Commercial Treaties, Neutrality and the Aftershocks of the Spanish Succession" (CORE Working Paper 2015-II), 16 p.

The Research Group CORE (Contextual Research in Law) at the Free University of Brussels (VUB), which I recently joined as a lecturer, has just published a working paper on the commercial aspects of European diplomacy after the War of the Spanish Succession. An earlier version of this text was presented in January at the "Balance of Power/Balance of Trade"-conference at St Andrews University.

Abstract:

The Peace of Utrecht (11 April 1713) ended a century of bloodshed on the continent. Inter alia by setting new rules for trade with the Spanish Indies and redesigning the balance of Italy. Yet, five years later, a new conflict broke out. France and Britain united with the Emperor against Spain. No particular convention was reached regarding commercial matters for the duration of the conflict. The present paper analyses the complex interplay between trade policy, privateering, warfare, neutrality, corruption, consular and local jurisdiction and diplomatic intercession, based on individual cases contained in the French Maritime records (Archives Nationales, Marine, series B1), as well as Franco-British diplomatic correspondence (Archives Diplomatiques, National Archives). Its main purpose is to help understanding the disconnect between, on the one hand, cordial Franco-British relations regarding “high policy” and, on the other hand, unfettered commercial rivalry.

Fulltext here.

BOOK: Frederik DHONDT, Balance of Power and Norm Hierachy. Franco-British Diplomacy after the Peace of Utrecht [Legal History Library, vol. 17; Studies in the History of International Law, vol. 7, ed. Randall LESAFFER] (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff/Brill, 2015), 636 p. ISBN 9789004293748

.

(image source: Brill)

It is my pleasure to announce the publication of Balance of Power and Norm Hierarchy. Franco-British Diplomacy after the Peace of Utrecht, an updated, redrafted and extended version of my doctoral dissertation in law (promoter: Prof. D. Heirbaut/UGent), defended at Ghent University on 13 September 2013.  This publication is part of the book series "Legal History Library" and the sub-series "Studies in the History of International Law" (editor: Prof. R. Lesaffer/Tilburg-KUL).

Abstract:

Balance of Power and Norm Hierarchy: Franco-British Diplomacy after the Peace of Utrecht offers a detailed study of French and British diplomacy in the age of ‘Walpole and Fleury’. After Louis XIV’s decease, European international relations were dominated by the collaboration between James Stanhope and Guillaume Dubois. Their alliance focused on the amendment and enlargement of the peace treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden. In-depth analysis of vast archival material uncovers the practical legal arguments used between Hampton Court and Versailles. ‘Balance of Power’ or ‘Tranquillity of Europe’ were in fact metaphors for the predominance of treaty law even over the most fundamental municipal norms. An implacable logic of norm hierarchy allowed to consolidate peace in Europe.

The book is available both on paper (€ 179 + tax) and electronically (with the possibility to buy separate chapters, € 25 + tax).
 
Table of contents:

• Preliminary Material

  • Source: pp i –xii

• Introduction

  • Source: pp 1 –40

• The System of Stanhope and Dubois (1717–1723)

  • Source: pp 41 –252

• Stanhope and Dubois’s Diplomatic Legacy

  • Source: pp 253 –428

• Jealousy and Misunderstandings? The Disintegration of the European System (1731–1740)

  • Source: pp 429 –499

• Conclusion

  • Source: pp 500 –514

• Chronology

  • Source: pp 515 –550

• Simplified Genealogies

  • Source: pp 551 –566

• Sources

  • Source: pp 567 –584

• Bibliography

  • Source: pp 585 –627

• Index

  • Source: pp 628 –636

See also the preview on Google Books.

ARTICLE: Charles de Gaulle, Anti-Hegemonic Discourse and International Law (Forum Historiae Iuris, 12 March 2015)

(image source: forum historiae iuris)

I published an article on Forum Historiae Iuris, the peer-reviewed electronic journal of the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History.

Find out more here (xml-version, pdf).

Abstract:

French President Charles de Gaulle (1890-1970) was a controversial figure on the international scene during the Cold War. He steered an original and provocative course bordering on independence from the bipolar structure of post-1945 world politics. De Gaulle’s combination of national independence and a global appeal to state sovereignty casts a long shadow over foreign policy debates in France and in Europe. Although his references to the long run of geopolitics, to history or to “Grandeur” seemed to run against the course of history for many contemporaries, de Gaulle’s discourse can be linked up with timeless normative understandings between states. Self-determination, national legitimacy and independence are the precondition to a system whereby state consent creates norms.
The present contribution concentrates on the legal arguments employed to support de Gaulle’s audacious speeches, travels and press conferences. My analysis aims to complement classical diplomatic history. Law is seen as a vector of consensus, used to attract partners in a horizontal normative environment. During the Cold War, vertical integration within ideological blocs was a consequence of military and strategic necessity. However, the balance of nuclear deterrence created political leverage for second-rank states, conformable to the fundamental legal values of liberty and equality as essential components of sovereignty within international society. Sovereignty can be seen as a pretext to undermine collective structures, but is a recall of states’ double quality as both legal subjects and norm creators. The common liberty of all actors in the international arena is a bulwark against top-down descending unification. Bottom-up legitimated notions of justice and law resurface when we analyse primary sources in detail. Pragmatic political discourse and normative legal discourse are constantly cross-disseminated. International relations are not legal at an instant and political at another, but bear the same, mixed taint at every instance.
This article starts by sketching the implications of Second World War on the traditional European system (A) and will then address the three main areas of French foreign policy in the 1960s (B): Political intergovernmental cooperation, supranational economic integration, and the nature of the transnational military and strategic partnership.
De Gaulle’s perturbing diplomatic action had a double objective. On the internal front, he strived to restore national pride after the Algerian imbroglio, and to mark a turn-around for the French economy. On the external front, he wanted to recall the perpetual rules of international relations to the hegemonic power within the Western bloc. Both were intimately linked . The United States, imbued with a missionary conviction that their action would ultimately lead to stability and peace through the rule of law , had to be reminded that the international society functioned as an arena. For de Gaulle, every state (including the new ones, created in the wave of decolonisation), had a legitimate claim to further its own national interest, irrespective of supranational order . The order propagated by the Americans entailed a consensus around values which de Gaulle found naïve. For de Gaulle, there was no genuine “common international interest” behind the structure of the post-1945 international organizations, but merely badly disguised attempts to manipulate allies . A Europe of States, “from the Atlantic to the Ural”, did not distinguish between East and West, whereas, for Washington, including the former would be impossible .
Yet, distinct sets of values and geopolitically determined interests did not necessarily entail armed confrontation, but reflected a realist perspective on international relations. Polycentrism, echoing the horizontal order after the Peace of Utrecht (1713 ) or the 19th Century Concert of Europe, was achievable. Not in terms of physical capability, but in terms of political decision centres, where international discourse could be mastered independent from the leading ally . De Gaulle was convinced that his opinion was so self-evidently internally valid and reflected structural necessity for the international system, that history would prove him right .
The jurist’s position in specific political discourse is very close to complete apology. De Gaulle saw political will as the prima donna of international lawmaking (as the Luxemburg compromise, and the Fouchet proposals demonstrate) and relied on the unilateral interpretation of agreements (cf. the NATO decisions of 1966). Yet, de Gaulle’s advocacy of the international arena as one of confrontation did entail a minimum consensus on values. In itself, the promotion of a multipolar and egalitarian international society is a normative principle, relying on reciprocal consent and advantage, inextricably linked with a European tradition of diplomatic culture, which functions as the nurturing and mutually influenced infrastructure of legal discourse.

New paper on SSRN: "Delenda Est Haec Carthago ! The Ostend Company as a Problem of European Great Power Politics (1722-1727)" (Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire/Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis, CXIII (2015), No. 2, 397-437; DOI 10.3406/rbph.2015.8840)

With the kind permission of the journal, I posted a paper on the Social Science Research Network, forthcoming as an article in the Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire/Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis. The text discusses the legal debate between the Dutch Republic and Emperor Charles VI of the Holy Roman Empire on the right of the inhabitants of the Austrian Netherlands to participate in trade on the High Seas. The Ostend Company, a joint stock corporation, had been recognised by the Emperor in 1722. Its tea imports from the East Indies drove down prices and harmed the market share of Dutch and British competitors. The Maritime Powers protested against this intrusion and obtained the suspension and then suppression of the Company, first at the Parisian Preliminaries (31 May 1727), and finally at the Treaty of Vienna (March 1731). Traditionally, historiography sees this as a question of power politics, a symbol of the sorry fate of present-day Belgium as an object of Great Power Politics. The Ostend Company was not a priority for Emperor Charles VI, a far-away monarch ruling from Vienna, who preferred international recognition of his Pragmatic Sanction. Lawyers, on the other hand, tend either to reproduce the victors' position and ignore arguments brought forward by the 'Belgians', or fail to perceive the impact of multilateral diplomacy on practical legal reasoning. My contribution challenges these idées reçues from the angle of contextual legal history. Law is not a pure autoreferential textual science. Studying big names is often a synonym for what is in fact a disguised study of political thought or legal philosophy, and not of international law. Conversely, history should not ignore the systematic thinking common to European lawyers, as an essential element of political culture and communication, as well as a way to structure life in society.

First, big names as Jean du Mont de Carels-kroon (compiler of a treaty collection of major importance, the Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens) and Jean Barbeyrac (translator of Pufendorf and Grotius, professor of public law in Groningen) showed an impressive display of legal reasoning, using a broad array of sources of the Ancien Régime's pluralist and multi-layered normative order. If their writings are explored in detail, the debate comes across as much more nuanced than usually projected. The traditional Dutch argument stated that the High Seas were fundamentally common to mankind. No sovereign could claim a property right or a right of exclusion, since the High Seas are essential to commercial intercourse between all nations on earth. Hugo Grotius had proclaimed this principle in the early 17th century, drawn from the Digest, against Spanish, Portuguese or British claims to exclusive dominium on the High Seas. Yet, in order to counter an unwelcome commercial competitor, the lawyers of the Dutch East India Company argued a century later against the Ostend Company that every state could dispose of this right by treaty (mare liberum, pactis clausum).  In other words, what had seemed peremptory for Grotius, as an essential right for any sovereign, had now become a mere faculty in the eyes of his countrymen. The latter opposition is traditionally taken as the essence of the discussion. From the Dutch side, it was argued that Philip IV had forever abandoned a right guaranteed in peremptory natural law, creating a permanent limitation on the Southern Netherlands, irrespective of the identity of their future sovereign. The Imperial side, on the other had, argued that such an exception was contrary to the essence of the right of navigation on the High Seas: even if it had not been exercised, the right was inalienable.

However, even if we accept that a state can renounce its right to navigate on the High Seas, the 1725 Treaty of Commerce between Philip V of Spain and Charles VI utterly destroyed the Dutch argument: if a state can auto-limit its access to the High Seas by a convention, the reverse should be true as well: mare liberum, pactis apertum. The Treaty of Munster (1648) was seen by the Dutch Republic as an auto-limitation imposed by Philip IV of Spain on the inhabitants of the Southern Netherlands, transmitted to his successor at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession.  In 1725, Charles VI, as Philip IV's successor in Flanders, Brabant, Mechelen, Hainault... obtained exactly the opposite from Philip IV's successor as King of Castille: access to the Spanish colonies. Whoever has the competence to impose restrictions, can lift them again (ejus est solvere, cujus est ligare). In other words, the discussion on the modalities of the peremptory law of nature-norm 'Mare Liberum' had become irrelevant. Even if a 'renunciation' of the right to navigate on the High Seas were to be admitted, this renunciation had just been cancelled out by a new treaty ! Charles VI dropped the Ostend Company at the Parisian Peace Preliminaries of 31 May 1727 (confirmed in 1731), but had a strong case during his (albeit short-lived) alliance with the King of Spain.

Secondly, lawyers often see the multilateral diplomatic process leading to the Ostend Company's elimination as a game of tough and crude politics of interest, aloof from any normative arguments or systematic reasoning. This is in part due to the relative research gap concerning diplomatic practice in legal history. The suppression of the Ostend Company is not a product of short-term politics, but is a logical consequence of the Franco-British dominated legal order imposed at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. The treaties of Utrecht (April 1713), Rastatt (March 1714) and Baden (September 1714) constituted the core of international order and the constant point of reference in further negotiations on international problems. Subsequent treaties of guarantee (Franco-British Treaty, 1716; Triple Alliance, 1717; Quadruple Alliance, 1718) installed a normative hierarchy. Between treaty law and fundamental norms (in the case of Philip V of Spain's renunciation to the French throne, or in that of the successions in the Italian Imperial fiefs of Parma, Piacenza and Tuscany), but also within the normative order of treaty law itself. Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden became the touchstone for any territorial or political claim. The 1725 Treaty of Commerce concluded between Charles VI and Philip V was stillborn, in the sense that it accompanied a monstrous alliance. The Empire of Charles V, uniting the Habsburg possessions in Italy, Belgium, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and the Indies, was virtually resuscitated through a secret marriage clause in the main treaty of alliance. The spectre of Universal Monarchy haunted European diplomacy again ! As a logical annex to the political provisions of the alliance, the treaty of commerce had no realistic chance of survival. The Ostend Company was not a bilateral affair in essence. Calculations in broader European politics were not the product of 'selfishness' or 'crude calculation', but were structured according to legal thinking. Diplomats and bureaucrats had received a schooling in either classical languages, Roman law or German public law, and structured the horizontal interactions between sovereigns according to common normative understandings. If the Pragmatic Sanction had more priority than the Ostend Company, this was not a consequence of Charles VI's arbitrary personal taste, but an application of the international system of guarantee for national succession orders which had already been used by France and Great Britain, conformable to the Utrecht logic.

Text on SSRN (click here, e-journal Conflicts Studies: International Relations Theory; e-journal Legal History), or in the second issue of next year's RBPH-BTFG.

Update (25 February 2016): This article has now been published. Reference: "Delenda est haec Carthago: The Ostend Company As Problem Of European Great Power Politics (1722-1727)". Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire/Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis XCLIII (2015), No. 2, pp. 397-437 (ISSN 0035-0818).

Update 2: this text is now online in open access on Persée. DOI: 10.3406/rbph.2015.8840.

SSRN ("Looking Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg: Diplomatic Praxis and Legal Culture in the History of Public International Law"

 

I posted my forthcoming article "Looking Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg: Diplomatic Praxis and Legal Culture in the History of Public International Law" on the SSRN research network. The article is to appear in the second issue of Rechtskultur - Zeitschrift für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte/European Journal of Legal History/Journal européen d'histoire du droit (ISSN 2568-4469), dedicated to methodology and sources in European Legal History. This -increasingly popular- method of sharing texts before their actual publication is rather new for me. I previously refrained from using SSRN, fearing copyright issues. Consequently, I obtained the main editor's permission to share this pre-peer-reviewed version, before I went ahead with it.

The contribution in question is a synopsis of the methodological and theoretical issues encountered during my doctoral research on the use of legal argumentation by European Diplomacy in the early eighteenth century and after 1945. Tackling such a subject requires training in international law (of course), diplomatic history, international relations and legal history. Consequently, one tries to avoid both evident and hidden pitfalls and traps. A study of "text in context" requires both the rigour of legal reasoning and the collection of salient details in literary, esthetic diplomatic writing. Moreover, the comparison between two epochs seems at first sight a long shot, and many lawyers have their doubts on the use of history to explain contemporary positive norms. Yet, insights from other social sciences (sociology, cultural history, antropology) can help. If you are curious to find out how I suggest resolving the conundrum, I kindly invite you to read the text at this location.

E-Journals: European Public Law,  Law and Humanities, Legal History, Political Institutions: International Institutions, Philosophy of Law.

Update 15 November 2013: In the meanwhile, the journal Rechtskultur - Zeitschrift für Europäische Rechtsgeschichte - European Journal of Legal History - Journal européen d'histoire du droit has published its second issue, containing the abovementioned text on the pages 31 to 42. More information: Edition Rechtskultur. DOI 10.17176/20210121-120051-0.