"Catalonia, the European State System and International Limits to Self-Determination" (BelConLawBlog)

The Belgian Constitutional Law Blog (an initiative of the Public Law-department at Ghent University) published some historical reflections by your most humble servant on the relationship between Catalonia and Spain. Click here.

Geografie en demografie

Twee interessante podcasts rond voor Fransen intrinsiek met geschiedenis of internationale betrekkingen verbonden sociale wetenschappen: demografie en geografie:
- Concordance des temps van afgelopen zaterdag met Hervé Le Bras (co-auteur met Emmanuel Todd van een uitstekende socio-geografie van Frankrijk, die wijst op de positieve elementen van de Franse bevolkingssamenstelling): de uitzending behandelt de territoriale opknipping van Frankrijk van Ancien Régime tot vandaag, naar aanleiding van de herindeling van de Franse regio's door Hollande (link hier)
- Les enjeux internationaux: over de demografie van de EU, waarmee het slecht gesteld is. Uitgenomen Frankrijk en Groot-Brittannië is er een tekort aan immigratie. Sinds de crisis is de migratie naar Europa gehalveerd. Vooral de Oost-Europese lidstaten hebben een zeer lage vervangingsratio. De spreker (Pierre Verluise) koppelt demografie snel aan militaire en andere grootmachts-veerkracht, maar er zijn ook links met economische dynamiek (link hier).

Just War (Concordance des temps)

(Urbanus II roept op tot de eerste kruistocht; afbeelding: herodote.net)

 

Concordance des temps wijdde afgelopen zaterdag een uitzending aan een klassieker van het volkenrecht: de doctrine van de rechtvaardige oorlog. Of beter, correctie, de theologische wortels. Hoe kan het gerechtvaardigd zijn om geweld te gebruiken, terwijl het christendom zich daar principieel tegen afzet ? 

De Kerk ontwikkelde in de middeleeuwen een leer die de bedoeling had om de inzet van geweld te beperken. Uiteraard kon de Paus oproepen tot een kruistocht tegen ongelovigen. Uiteraard konden vorsten oorlog voeren tegen een agressor... Maar wie was voldoende soeverein om oorlog te mogen voeren (= in te schatten hoe moreel fout de tegenpartij zat en hoe gerechtvaardigd het was om actie te ondernemen) ? Enkel de Keizer ? De Koning van Frankrijk ? Die van Spanje ? Wat met de grote vazallen ? Naarmate de politiek-confessionele eenheid van de christelijke wereld verbrokkelde, had ook het morele kader minder en minder zin. In de Nieuwe Tijd evolueerde het recht om oorlog te voeren de facto tot een arbitraire bevoegdheid van elke vorst en een normaal middel om ruzies te beslechten.

Toch zijn veel argumenten van de hedendaagse jus ad bellum-(recht om oorlog te voeren)-doctrine terug te voeren tot de theologie:

- proportionaliteit (niet meer geweld gebruiken dan de agressor tegen jou)

- auctoritas of bevoegdheid (in het hedendaagse oorlogsrecht is het gebruik van geweld in principe verboden, behoudens toestemming van de VN-Veiligheidsraad, of behoudens gewettigde zelfverdediging), 

- recta intentio of intentie (enkel vergelding, geen haat), 

- justa causa of gerechtvaardxigde oorzaak (geen loutere veroveringsoorlog)

Naast de morele functie die de paus vervult aan het hoofd van een wereldgodsdienst (cf. inleiding van de uitzending: situatie van de christenen in Irak), is dus ook het juridische kader waarin de Kerk het gebruik van geweld als gerechtvaardigd ziet, niet zonder betekenis. De hersengymnastiek die ermee gepaard gaat, is ook voor de jurist als redeneermachine relevant. Jean-Noël Jeanneney overloopt met André Vauchez (Institut de France) een aantal interessante themata uit dit bijzonder uitgebreide leerstuk.

"Actualité de Socrate" (Concordance des Temps, 18 oktober)

Een zeer aangename uitzending van Concordance des Temps (France Culture) over Socrates. Voor iedereen die wat Griekse filosofie heeft gekregen, op welk niveau dan ook, een herontdekking (Wie was Socrates ? Wat weten we over hem ? Welke invloeden hadden zijn leerlingen op ons beeld ? Zijn er nog andere bronnen dan die van zijn navolgers ? Hoe zat het met zijn proces ? Welke band tussen het Humanisme en Socrates, de Verlichting en Socrates ?). Podcast en meer informatie hier.

New paper on SSRN: "Delenda Est Haec Carthago ! The Ostend Company as a Problem of European Great Power Politics (1722-1727)" (Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire/Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis, CXIII (2015), No. 2, 397-437; DOI 10.3406/rbph.2015.8840)

With the kind permission of the journal, I posted a paper on the Social Science Research Network, forthcoming as an article in the Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire/Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Nieuwste Geschiedenis. The text discusses the legal debate between the Dutch Republic and Emperor Charles VI of the Holy Roman Empire on the right of the inhabitants of the Austrian Netherlands to participate in trade on the High Seas. The Ostend Company, a joint stock corporation, had been recognised by the Emperor in 1722. Its tea imports from the East Indies drove down prices and harmed the market share of Dutch and British competitors. The Maritime Powers protested against this intrusion and obtained the suspension and then suppression of the Company, first at the Parisian Preliminaries (31 May 1727), and finally at the Treaty of Vienna (March 1731). Traditionally, historiography sees this as a question of power politics, a symbol of the sorry fate of present-day Belgium as an object of Great Power Politics. The Ostend Company was not a priority for Emperor Charles VI, a far-away monarch ruling from Vienna, who preferred international recognition of his Pragmatic Sanction. Lawyers, on the other hand, tend either to reproduce the victors' position and ignore arguments brought forward by the 'Belgians', or fail to perceive the impact of multilateral diplomacy on practical legal reasoning. My contribution challenges these idées reçues from the angle of contextual legal history. Law is not a pure autoreferential textual science. Studying big names is often a synonym for what is in fact a disguised study of political thought or legal philosophy, and not of international law. Conversely, history should not ignore the systematic thinking common to European lawyers, as an essential element of political culture and communication, as well as a way to structure life in society.

First, big names as Jean du Mont de Carels-kroon (compiler of a treaty collection of major importance, the Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens) and Jean Barbeyrac (translator of Pufendorf and Grotius, professor of public law in Groningen) showed an impressive display of legal reasoning, using a broad array of sources of the Ancien Régime's pluralist and multi-layered normative order. If their writings are explored in detail, the debate comes across as much more nuanced than usually projected. The traditional Dutch argument stated that the High Seas were fundamentally common to mankind. No sovereign could claim a property right or a right of exclusion, since the High Seas are essential to commercial intercourse between all nations on earth. Hugo Grotius had proclaimed this principle in the early 17th century, drawn from the Digest, against Spanish, Portuguese or British claims to exclusive dominium on the High Seas. Yet, in order to counter an unwelcome commercial competitor, the lawyers of the Dutch East India Company argued a century later against the Ostend Company that every state could dispose of this right by treaty (mare liberum, pactis clausum).  In other words, what had seemed peremptory for Grotius, as an essential right for any sovereign, had now become a mere faculty in the eyes of his countrymen. The latter opposition is traditionally taken as the essence of the discussion. From the Dutch side, it was argued that Philip IV had forever abandoned a right guaranteed in peremptory natural law, creating a permanent limitation on the Southern Netherlands, irrespective of the identity of their future sovereign. The Imperial side, on the other had, argued that such an exception was contrary to the essence of the right of navigation on the High Seas: even if it had not been exercised, the right was inalienable.

However, even if we accept that a state can renounce its right to navigate on the High Seas, the 1725 Treaty of Commerce between Philip V of Spain and Charles VI utterly destroyed the Dutch argument: if a state can auto-limit its access to the High Seas by a convention, the reverse should be true as well: mare liberum, pactis apertum. The Treaty of Munster (1648) was seen by the Dutch Republic as an auto-limitation imposed by Philip IV of Spain on the inhabitants of the Southern Netherlands, transmitted to his successor at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession.  In 1725, Charles VI, as Philip IV's successor in Flanders, Brabant, Mechelen, Hainault... obtained exactly the opposite from Philip IV's successor as King of Castille: access to the Spanish colonies. Whoever has the competence to impose restrictions, can lift them again (ejus est solvere, cujus est ligare). In other words, the discussion on the modalities of the peremptory law of nature-norm 'Mare Liberum' had become irrelevant. Even if a 'renunciation' of the right to navigate on the High Seas were to be admitted, this renunciation had just been cancelled out by a new treaty ! Charles VI dropped the Ostend Company at the Parisian Peace Preliminaries of 31 May 1727 (confirmed in 1731), but had a strong case during his (albeit short-lived) alliance with the King of Spain.

Secondly, lawyers often see the multilateral diplomatic process leading to the Ostend Company's elimination as a game of tough and crude politics of interest, aloof from any normative arguments or systematic reasoning. This is in part due to the relative research gap concerning diplomatic practice in legal history. The suppression of the Ostend Company is not a product of short-term politics, but is a logical consequence of the Franco-British dominated legal order imposed at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession. The treaties of Utrecht (April 1713), Rastatt (March 1714) and Baden (September 1714) constituted the core of international order and the constant point of reference in further negotiations on international problems. Subsequent treaties of guarantee (Franco-British Treaty, 1716; Triple Alliance, 1717; Quadruple Alliance, 1718) installed a normative hierarchy. Between treaty law and fundamental norms (in the case of Philip V of Spain's renunciation to the French throne, or in that of the successions in the Italian Imperial fiefs of Parma, Piacenza and Tuscany), but also within the normative order of treaty law itself. Utrecht, Rastatt and Baden became the touchstone for any territorial or political claim. The 1725 Treaty of Commerce concluded between Charles VI and Philip V was stillborn, in the sense that it accompanied a monstrous alliance. The Empire of Charles V, uniting the Habsburg possessions in Italy, Belgium, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire and the Indies, was virtually resuscitated through a secret marriage clause in the main treaty of alliance. The spectre of Universal Monarchy haunted European diplomacy again ! As a logical annex to the political provisions of the alliance, the treaty of commerce had no realistic chance of survival. The Ostend Company was not a bilateral affair in essence. Calculations in broader European politics were not the product of 'selfishness' or 'crude calculation', but were structured according to legal thinking. Diplomats and bureaucrats had received a schooling in either classical languages, Roman law or German public law, and structured the horizontal interactions between sovereigns according to common normative understandings. If the Pragmatic Sanction had more priority than the Ostend Company, this was not a consequence of Charles VI's arbitrary personal taste, but an application of the international system of guarantee for national succession orders which had already been used by France and Great Britain, conformable to the Utrecht logic.

Text on SSRN (click here, e-journal Conflicts Studies: International Relations Theory; e-journal Legal History), or in the second issue of next year's RBPH-BTFG.

Update (25 February 2016): This article has now been published. Reference: "Delenda est haec Carthago: The Ostend Company As Problem Of European Great Power Politics (1722-1727)". Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Histoire/Belgisch Tijdschrift voor Filologie en Geschiedenis XCLIII (2015), No. 2, pp. 397-437 (ISSN 0035-0818).

Update 2: this text is now online in open access on Persée. DOI: 10.3406/rbph.2015.8840.

OUVRAGE: Olivier Ryckebusch & Rik Opsommer (dir.), Guerre, Frontière, Barrière et Paix en Flandre (Ieper: Stadsarchief Ieper, 2014) (ISBN 97890282229912)

Les archives de la Ville d'Ypres viennent de publier l'ouvrage Guerre, frontière, barrière et paix en Flandre (ISBN 978902882229912) Cet ouvrage est issu de deux journées d'études organisées en octobre et novembre 2013, à l'occasion du tricentenaire de la paix d'Utrecht (11 avril 1713). De nombreux spécialistes y ont contribué. La présentation officielle aura lieu le 28 novembre prochain à Ypres.

Table des matières:
• Préface du maire de Dunkerque (Patrice Vergriete)
 • Voorwoord door de schepen van Archief van de stad Ieper (Eva Ryde)
• drs. Olivier Ryckebusch (Lille-III) & Prof. dr. Rik Opsommer (UGent/Stadsarchief Ieper), “Préface”
• dr. Agathe Leyssens (Dunkerque), “Élites municipales et frontières en Flandre maritime”
• Prof. dr. Cédric Glineur (Le Havre), “Le régime juridique des passeports sous l’Ancien Régime : l’exemple des provinces du Nord”
• dr. Christian Pfister-Langanay (Univ. du Littoral), “La mission du sieur Boutillier à Dunkerque : entre fiscalité et espionnage (1712-1713)”
• dra. Fanny Souillart (Lille-II), “Le Parlement de Flandre, parlement de Louis XIV”
• dr. Frederik Dhondt (UGent), “’The Cursed Sluices of Dunkirk’ : Dunkerque, thermomètre des relations franco-britanniques après Utrecht ?’”
• PD dr. dr. Guido Braun (Bonn), “L’Allemagne et la France au temps de la guerre de succession d’Espagne : politique et culture”
• dr. Guy Thewes (Musée de la ville de Luxembourg), “Barrière ou talon d’Achille ? La défense militaire des Pays-Bas après les traités d’Utrecht (1713-1725)”
• drs. Michael W. Serruys (VUB), “Ypres, la Flandre rétrocédée et la politique de transit au XVIIIe siècle”
• dr. Michel Nuyttens, “La frontière franco-belge à travers les archives des États de Flandre”
• Prof. em. dr. Patrick Villiers (Université du Littoral), “Les corsaires dunkerquois et la frontière”
• Prof. dr. Lucien Bély (Université Paris-Sorbonne), “La frontière au temps de la Paix d’Utrecht : réalités et représentations”

Crimea and the Balkans revisited

Sadly enough, Ukraine and Crimea have frequently been in the centre of international attention since the Maidan demonstrations and the ensuing (Russian-inspired) disintegration of the Ukrainian State. International Lawyers produced interesting opinions on the legality of Putin's intervention or the Ukrainian government's right not to acknowledge the validity of the referendum. Some legal accounts start the story at Catharine the Great's conquest of Crimea during the Russo-Turkish War of the 1770s. Yet, the fascinating book of Prof. Ferenc Toth (Szombathely Univ.) published in 2011 by Economica, reminds us of the long term struggle for influence between Austria, Russia and the Ottoman Empire, with at its heart control of the Balkans and Ukraine. A combination of Balkan and Ukrainian warfare, recalling both regions' complex history.

A reminder to non-specialist readers of this blog: in the 1730s, the Austrian Habsburgs controlled grosso modo the current states of Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, plus parts of Romania and Poland.  Until the end of the 17th century, however, the Ottoman Empire had been at the gates of Vienna. Most of present-day Hungary and the Balkans had been under their control. The Ottoman Empire was not only at odds with the Habsburgs, but with the Russian Empire as well. Czar Peter the Great had expanded Russians domains in the Baltic (to the detriment of Sweden) and in the direction of the Black Sea, where it would inevitably clash with the Turks. In other words, the classical "eastern game" between Austria, Russia and the Turks, traditionally associated with the 19th century and the run-up to World War I, had been in place for quite a time by 1914.

(Europe in 1700; source: Wikimedia Commons. The Austrian Habsburgs' domains go well into the Balkans and present-day Romania and Poland; present-day Ukraine is divided between Poland, Russia, Austria and the Ottomans)

Toth's work is devoted to one specific conflict from 1737 to 1739. Well-known images of the sieges of Vienna (1526, 1683) recall the geopolitical confrontation between the Holy Roman Empire (even under Charles V, almost a synonym for universal monarchy) and the Sultan in Istanbul. Traditionally, historians focus on the battle of Mohacs (1526), where the ruling King of Hungary, Lajos II Jagellon, succumbed and enabled his brother-in-law Ferdinand to bring the latter Kingdom (as well as that of Bohemia) into the Habsburg orbit; on the relief of Vienna and the Imperial reconquest from 1683 to 1699, crowned by the Peace of Karlowitz (26 January 1699); or on Eugene of Savoy's successful campaigns in 1716 an 1717, leading to the fall of Belgrade for the Austrian army. The ensuing Peace of Passarowitz (21 July 1718) was an outright triumph for Emperor Charles VI.

 (Emperor Charles VI, Source: Wikimedia Commons)

(Czarina Anna by Caravaque, Source: Wikimedia Commons)

(Sultan Mahmud I "Gazi" (The Warrior); Source: Wikimedia Commons)

However, the situation in 1737 differed fundamentally from that twenty years earlier. Whereas Austria had been at its apex under Eugene of Savoy, the great commander had died in 1736 and the army had performed badly during the War of the Polish Succession (campaigns 1733-1735). Yet, Austria attacked the Ottoman Empire following the opening of hostilities between the latter and the Russians. The explanation is to be found in a text signed ten years before. On 6 August 1726, after the conclusion of the "Ripperda" Treaty (alliance between Spain and Emperor Charles VI), Russia had concluded an alliance with Austria. This combination could easily dominate Central and Eastern Europe. E.g. Prussia quickly abandoned its September 1725 alliance with Britain and France when the threat of an encirclement by the two Emperors became evident. According to one interpretation, the Russians even brought the War of the Polish Succession to an end by transferring troops to the Rhine.

Toth reminds us in his book that the Austro-Russian combination could well have brought the Ottoman Empire to its knees. Especially France was worried that the Ottomans would collapse. The Austro-Russian Alliance had implied not only Russian support for Austria. The opposite was true as well: Czarina Anna of Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 12 April 1736, and urged Austria to provide her with the necessary military assistance. Since Austria controlled Bosnia, Serbia and Temesvar on the basis of Eugene of Savoy's victories in 1717 (crowned by the Treaty of Passarowitz), launching an attack simultaneously would force the Sultan to divide his troops. 54 000 Russians under Münnich (German-born general who beat the French candidate to the Polish throne, Stanislas Leszcynczki) rushed to Crimea. The aim of the Russian expedition was purely punitive: the Tatars operating from the peninsula had to stop their raids into Russian territory. Bahçesarai, their capital, was captured and pillaged. The local Jesuit library was consumed by flames. Yet, the Russians could not remain in Crimea for logistical reasons: they lacked food and water, suffering at the same time from the heath associated with the peninsula. Tatar revenge added to their misery: the destruction of wells and ressources caused the death of 30 000 Russian soldiers. However, Münnich's colleague Lacy did manage to capture Azov (on Ukrainian mainland), bombarding the city from the Black Sea. The explosion of a gun powder arsenal, destroying five mosques, brought the inhabitants to surrender.

The Austrians promised to bring 80 000 men in the field. Both armies could advance towards the south-east of Europe, dividing Moldova and Walachia between them. Austria would aim for Moldova, Greece, Eastern Bulgaria and Macedonia. In January 1737, Austrain ambassador Talman proposed his mediation in Istanbul, but merely to gain time. Austria drew subventions from Rome for a war against infidel and counted on auxiliaries from Saxony, Wolffenbüttel or the Order of Malta. Numerous individual volunteers across Europe enrolled, including an officer from Peru, subject of the King of Spain ! On paper, Charles VI had 120 000 men in Hungary. Formally, the Austrian declaration of war was framed as am ultimatum to the Sultan. Either negotiations brought an agreement between Russia or the Ottomans, by 1 May 1737, or Austria would enter the war on the Russian side. Hostilities focused on Serbia. Yet, the Austrian generals blundered repeatedly. Their armies suffered desertion, and the local Orthodox population did not rebel against the Ottomans, mainly because of the Austrians' intolerant religious policy against non-Catholics. Battle or siege sites sadly recall names from the 1990s: Banja Luka, Belgrade, Nis...

When the Austrian army lost Nis on 16 October 1737, the court in Vienna held its commander, general Doxat, accountable for the débâcle. He was judged by an ad-hoc military tribunal and publicly executed in Belgrade in March 1738. His colleague Seckendorff, who commanded an army by the Rhine during the War of the Polish Succession, was in the centre of Jesuit-led public anger. The Protestant General, who owed his career to the deceased Eugene of Savoy, did not lose his head, but was jailed until the end of Charles VI's reign. Seckendorff had been beseiging Another fortress, Usiza, while the Turks reconquered Nis behind his back!

The Russian army under Lacy could not hold on to Crimea, and had to evacuate the peninsula by September 1737.  New attempts in 1738 were stopped by continuous Turkish and Tatar raids, forcing 85 000 Russians to withdraw to Ukraine. Nevertheless, Lacy managed to construct roads and bridges from Crimea to Azov. On the Balkans as well as on the Black Sea's North coasts, the lack of geographical knowledge, bad hygiene, the harsh climate and logistical difficulties brought operations to a standstill.

Königsegg, former ambassador in Madrid in the 1720s, replaced Seckendorff (cf. above, jailed), but to no avail. In August 1738, the Ottomans took the fortress of Adakalé on the Danube and advanced westwards to Belgrade. The situation became threatening, Austria risked losing Belgrade ! Russian aid was not to be expected. In spite of promises to reinforce Transylvania (part of present-day Romania), Czarina Anna saw looming threats in Poland and Sweden, preferring to anticipate a two-front war. 

Cardinal Fleury, Louis XV's Prime Minister, feared the rise of Russia. French diplomatic intervention aimed at the swift conclusion of a Treaty of Peace, in order to protect the Ottomans, its privileged commercial partner since the 16th century alliance brokered by Francis I against Charles V. Consequently, France offered to let its diplomats act as mediators between Austria and Russia and the Sultan. The Russians asked for the Maritime Powers' involvement, as they hoped Britain and the Dutch Republic would be less favourable to the Turks.

We should not see this diplomatic game as the equivalent of the web of alliances leading to the outbreak of World War I, where the assassination of Franz Ferdinand put the whole of Europe in arms. Russia would not (yet) participate in an all-out continental war until the Seven Years' War (1756-1763).  The main motive for Western involvement was trade. And, of course, prestige. Any power able to impose its mediation on the three eastern Empires would automatically enhance its standing. France had always played this game, hoping the Ottoman diversion would keep the Empire from intervening in the West. Louis XIV pushed it to the most extreme version: while Emperor Leopold I was busy fighting the Turks in Vienna -with the aid of an international coalition- France annexed Strasburg, occupied Luxemburg and bombed cities in the Spanish Netherlands.

 (Cardinal Fleury by Rigaud, 1728, source: Wikimedia Commons)

In 1739, the campaigns came to a stalemate. The battle of Grocka (22 July 1739) can count as an example: it cost the Austrian army -now under the command of the aged Irish general Wallis- more than 2 000 deaths and of almost 3 000 wounded to obtain a Pyrrhic victory along the Danube. The Ottoman armies employed techniques transferred by the French renegade Bonneval Pasha, and were now using bayonets ! Five days later, the Turks laid siege to Belgrade.

At this point, the court of Saint-Petersburg opted for a quick piece with the Sultan. Fears of Swedish revenge on Russia (to consolidate Peter the Great's conquests, e.g. the current Baltic states), assisted by the French navy, cut Czarina Anna's appetite for further difficult campaigns in Crimea, where Russian cossacks could not stop the Tatars. In spite of general Münnich's taking of Hotin, a fortress in Moldova, Russia tried to bring the conflict to an end. On 19 May 1739, Grand Vizir Yegen Mehmet Pasha, who wished to continue the war until Russia was brought on its knees, was replaced by a less bellicose successor, the Pasha of Vidin. From this moment on, the French ambassador, Marquis Villeneuve, who had been living in Istanbul for ten years, was mandated to mediate between the belligerents.

(Peace Preliminaries, 1 September 1739, Source: Bayrische Staatsbibliothek)

Charles VI sent Count Neipperg, another of Eugene of Savoy's men, to negotiate a peace deal with the Ottomans. Unfortunately, Neipperg was cut off from communications with the Austrian army. Whereas Wallis had first proposed to surrender Belgrade, he had been summoned to reinforce its garrison. Finally, Wallis even obtained some minor victories, pushing back the Turkish army ! On the ground, the Austrians regained hope. At the negotiating table, however, Neipperg conceded Belgrade to the Pasha of Vidin. Neipperg was incessantly guarded by a company of janissaries, and could not interact with the French delegation. The Turks further intimidated Neipperg by holding interminable military celebrations and interrupting the talks during the Grand Vizir's frequent illnesses. Finally, Neipperg negotiated the cession of Belgrade, with its walls destroyed. The Pasha of Bosnia, replacing the Grand Vizir, brokered the deal. On 1 September 1739, preliminaries of peace were signed between Charles VI and Sultan Mahmut I. Belgrade (art. I) the whole of the province of Serbia (art. III), and the parts of Wallachia occupied by Austria (art. IV) returned to the Ottoman Empire. The alliance between Russia and Austria, however, forbade the conclusion of a separate peace. Consequently, Villeneuve proposed that Russia would keep the city of Azov, destroy its fortifications, and respect the neutrality of the surrounding area. After some commercial discussions on free navigation of the Black Sea (potentially detrimental to French privileges !), the final Peace Treaties were concluded on 19 September 1739.

Finally, a year later (December 1740), Frederick of Prussia invaded Silesia. If the war between Habsburg and the Ottomans had continued, the House of Austria would have been in even greater peril than it actually was... Toth concludes that France came out victorious: the Ottoman Empire had been strengthened. In combination with Prussia's rise, Versailles now disposed of strong "alliances de revers" to block Austrian plans in the West. After the Peace of Belgrade, Franco-Ottoman capitulations were renewed, including potential extensions to the Black Sea.Was Neipperg "a traitor", conceding peace whereas the efforts of the Emperor's military would have allowed for further successes ? Probably not, first in view of his relative isolation but foremost in view of the Austrian's logistical difficulties.

I would warmly recommend reading Ferenc Toth's excellent study on an often forgotten conflict. There is ample material on Eugene of Savoy's glorious taking of  Belgrade in 1717, but the less glorious episode twenty years later is all too quickly forgotten. Moreover, for those wishing to see some detail of the pity state Charles VI's army was in at the Emperor's decease and the invasion of Silesia, Toth's book shows many familiar characteristics: quarrelling generals, bad coordination, poor logistical organisation, bad geographical references...

Voorkeurstemmen en Dewachterscores (finaal)

Het uiteindelijke bilan van de verkiezingen 2014 ziet er als volgt uit (alle verkiezingen samen):

1	Bart De Wever	x	NVA	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	314.650	699,295
2	Elio Di Rupo	x	PS	Provincie Henegouwen 2014	181.964	423,965
3	Liesbeth Homans	x	NVA	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	163.502	366,785
4	Kris Peeters	x	CD&V	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	140.564	343,330
5	Maggie De Block	x	VLD	Provincie Vlaams-Brabant 2014	131.713	340,846
6	Hilde Crevits	x	CD&V	Provincie West-Vlaanderen 2014	112.557	280,664
7	Guy Verhofstadt	x	VLD	Nederlandstalig Kiescollege 2014	531.030	274,224
8	Alexander De Croo	x	VLD	Provincie Oost-Vlaanderen 2014	78.073	199,722
9	Johan Vande Lanotte	x	sp.a	Provincie West-Vlaanderen 2014	68.898	186,177
10	Marianne Thyssen	x	CD&V	Nederlandstalig Kiescollege 2014	340.026	176,452
11	Gwendolyn Rutten	x	VLD	Provincie Vlaams-Brabant 2014	60.807	167,117
12	Wouter Beke	x	CD&V	Provincie Limburg 2014	59.291	165,653
13	Jan Peumans	x	NVA	Provincie Limburg 2014	63.780	163,694
14	Jo Vandeurzen	x	CD&V	Provincie Limburg 2014	57.650	160,460
15	Didier Reynders	x	MR	Kieskring Brussel-Hoofdstad 2014	54.475	156,299
16	Paul Magnette	x	PS	Kieskring Charleroi 2014	49.978	155,166
17	Geert Bourgeois	x	NVA	Provincie West-Vlaanderen 2014	63.302	153,185
18	Mathias De Clercq	x	VLD	Provincie Oost-Vlaanderen 2014	58.572	151,654
19	Hendrik Bogaert	x	CD&V	Provincie West-Vlaanderen 2014	58.649	150,684
20	Siegfried Bracke	x	NVA	Provincie Oost-Vlaanderen 2014	64.481	149,990
21	Louis Michel	x	MR	Franstalig Kiescollege 2014	264.550	145,823
22	Joke Schauvliege	x	CD&V	Provincie Oost-Vlaanderen 2014	55.291	141,372
23	Filip Dewinter	x	VB	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	43.157	140,360
24	Marie Arena	x	PS	Franstalig Kiescollege 2014	186.103	139,774
25	Ben Weyts	x	NVA	Provincie Vlaams-Brabant 2014	55.012	136,972
26	Benoît Lutgen	x	cdH	Provincie Luxemburg 2014	36.340	136,769
27	Olivier Maingain	x	FDF	Kieskring Brussel-Hoofdstad 2014	32.246	133,826
28	Koen Geens	x	CD&V	Provincie Vlaams-Brabant 2014	45.686	132,072
29	Servais Verherstraeten	x	CD&V	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	51.202	130,286
30	Johan Van Overtveldt	x	NVA	Nederlandstalig Kiescollege 2014	247.444	128,408
31	Annemie Turtelboom	x	VLD	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	44.959	128,380
32	Meryem Almaci	x	groen	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	44.150	127,552
33	Freya Van den Bossche	x	sp.a	Provincie Oost-Vlaanderen 2014	45.863	124,570
34	Daniel Bacquelaine	x	MR	Provincie Luik 2014	46.230	121,708
35	Pieter De Crem	x	CD&V	Provincie Oost-Vlaanderen 2014	47.036	120,594
36	John Crombez	x	sp.a	Provincie West-Vlaanderen 2014	43.409	120,179
37	Wouter Van Besien	x	groen	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	40.507	117,430
38	Laurette Onkelinx	x	PS	Kieskring Brussel-Hoofdstad 2014	41.621	116,793
39	Willy Demeyer	x	PS	Provincie Luik 2014	45.590	115,439
40	Vincent Van Quickenborne	x	VLD	Provincie West-Vlaanderen 2014	38.896	112,711
41	Theo Francken	x	NVA	Provincie Vlaams-Brabant 2014	44.498	112,088
42	Melchior Wathelet	x	cdH	Provincie Luik 2014	34.780	112,084
43	Jean-Claude Marcourt	x	PS	Kieskring Luik 2014	38.460	111,714
44	Peter Vanvelthoven	x	sp.a	Provincie Limburg 2014	36.934	111,481
45	Olivier Chastel	x	MR	Provincie Henegouwen 2014	41.921	111,187
46	Matthias Diependaele	x	NVA	Provincie Oost-Vlaanderen 2014	47.112	109,895
47	Bart Somers	x	VLD	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	37.484	109,608
48	Bruno Tobback	x	sp.a	Provincie Vlaams-Brabant 2014	33.570	106,585
49	Steven Vandeput	x	NVA	Provincie Limburg 2014	41.211	106,102
50	Caroline Gennez	x	sp.a	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	37.960	105,401
51	Charles Michel	x	MR	Provincie Waals-Brabant 2014	34.101	103,091
52	Anke Van dermeersch	x	VB	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	31.540	102,709
53	Peter Mertens	x	PVDA	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	26.010	102,390
54	Ingrid Lieten	x	sp.a	Provincie Limburg 2014	33.005	100,854
55	Maxime Prévôt	x	cdH	Kieskring Namen 2014	21.912	98,761
56	Jean-Marie Dedecker		LDD	Provincie West-Vlaanderen 2014	17.774	98,102
57	Monica De Coninck	x	sp.a	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	35.441	97,712
58	Kathleen Van Brempt	x	sp.a	Nederlandstalig Kiescollege 2014	163.760	94,992
59	Patrick Dewael	x	VLD	Provincie Limburg 2014	27.155	93,829
60	Rudy Demotte	x	PS	Kieskring Ath-Doornik-Moeskroen 2014	25.730	93,377
61	Christine Defraigne	x	MR	Kieskring Luik 2014	27.842	91,651
62	Peter Van Rompuy	x	CD&V	Provincie Vlaams-Brabant 2014	32.198	91,529
63	Brecht Vermeulen	x	NVA	Provincie West-Vlaanderen 2014	37.005	90,081
64	Marino Keulen	x	VLD	Provincie Limburg 2014	24.573	86,227
65	Willy Borsus	x	MR	Kieskring Arlen-Marche-Bastogne 2014	12.793	84,761
66	Bart Tommelein	x	VLD	Provincie West-Vlaanderen 2014	28.462	84,175
67	Didier Gosuin	x	FDF	Brussels HG 2014	22.906	83,644
68	Karin Temmerman	x	sp.a	Provincie Oost-Vlaanderen 2014	30.291	83,547
69	Bart Staes	x	groen	Nederlandstalig Kiescollege 2014	133.183	83,042
70	Catherine Fonck	x	cdH	Provincie Henegouwen 2014	24.645	81,375
71	Jean-Luc Crucke	x	MR	Kieskring Ath-Doornik-Moeskroen 2014	19.531	81,099
72	Paul Furlan	x	PS	Kieskring Thuin 2014	16.451	80,529
73	Frédérique Ries	x	MR	Franstalig Kiescollege 2014	146.076	80,519
74	Marie-Dominique Simonet	x	cdH	Kieskring Luik 2014	17.564	80,033
75	Joëlle Milquet	x	cdH	Brussels HG 2014	19.416	79,272
76	Steven Vanackere		CD&V	Nederlandstalig Kiescollege 2014	150.929	78,323
77	André Flahaut	x	PS	Provincie Waals-Brabant 2014	19.698	77,750
78	Frédéric Daerden	x	PS	Provincie Luik 2014	30.484	77,189
79	Ivo Belet	x	CD&V	Nederlandstalig Kiescollege 2014	146.885	76,224
80	Pierre-Yves Jeholet	x	MR	Kieskring Verviers 2014	18.403	75,659
81	Hervé Jamar	x	MR	Kieskring Hoei-Borgworm 2014	15.221	75,539
82	Raf Terwingen	x	CD&V	Provincie Limburg 2014	26.838	74,982
83	David Clarinval	x	MR	Provincie Namen 2014	23.544	74,856
84	Jean-Marc Delizée	x	PS	Provincie Namen 2014	23.317	74,605
85	Sarah Smeyers	x	NVA	Provincie Oost-Vlaanderen 2014	31.700	73,738
86	Tinne Rombouts	x	CD&V	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	29.772	72,719
87	Philippe Courard	x	PS	Kieskring Arlen-Marche-Bastogne 2014	10.898	72,205
88	Kris Van Dijck	x	NVA	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	32.138	72,095
89	Lode Ceyssens	x	CD&V	Provincie Limburg 2014	25.662	71,426
90	Veerle Heeren	x	CD&V	Provincie Limburg 2014	25.317	70,733
91	Josy Arens	x	cdH	Kieskring Arlen-Marche-Bastogne 2014	13.101	70,226
92	Nicolas Martin	x	PS	Kieskring Bergen 2014	19.302	70,049
93	Francis Bellot	x	MR	Kieskring Dinant-Philippeville 2014	14.617	68,728
94	Annick De Ridder	x	NVA	Provincie Antwerpen 2014	30.573	68,585
95	Frieda Brepoels		NVA	Provincie Limburg 2014	26.489	68,199
96	Benoît Piedboeuf	x	MR	Provincie Luxemburg 2014	15.351	67,830
97	Gerolf Annemans	x	VB	Nederlandstalig Kiescollege 2014	90.056	67,637
98	Jean-Jacques De Gucht	x	VLD	Provincie Oost-Vlaanderen 2014	25.921	67,114
99	Eric Van Rompuy	x	CD&V	Provincie Vlaams-Brabant 2014	23.044	66,617
100	Guy Vanhengel	x	VLD	Brussels HG 2014	7.375	66,504

Verdeling binnen de top-100

CD&V	18
NVA	15
MR	14
PS	13
VLD	13
sp.a	10
cdH	7
Groen	3
VB	3
FDF	2
PVDA	1
LDD	1
PTB+	0
Ecolo	0

CD&V blijft dus met enige voorsprong de hofleverancier van de stemmenkanonnen. MR haalt ook hier (net als voor het Waals Parlement) het net op de PS.

Per partij:
CD&V:

1 Kris Peeters 343,330 2 Hilde Crevits 280,664 3 Marianne Thyssen 176,452 4 Wouter Beke 165,653 5 Jo Vandeurzen 160,460 6 Hendrik Bogaert 150,684 7 Joke Schauvliege 141,372 8 Koen Geens 132,072 9 Servais Verherstraeten 130,286 10 Pieter De Crem 120,594

 N-VA:

1	Bart De Wever	699,295
2	Liesbeth Homans	366,785
3	Jan Peumans	163,694
4	Geert Bourgeois	153,185
5	Siegfried Bracke	149,990
6	Ben Weyts	136,972
7	Johan Van Overtveldt	128,408
8	Theo Francken	112,088
9	Matthias Diependaele	109,895
10	Steven Vandeput	106,102

MR:

1 Didier Reynders 156,299 2 Louis Michel 145,823 3 Daniel Bacquelaine 121,708 4 Olivier Chastel 111,187 5 Charles Michel 103,091 6 Christine Defraigne 91,651 7 Willy Borsus 84,761 8 Jean-Luc Crucke 81,099 9 Frédérique Ries 80,519 10 Pierre-Yves Jeholet 75,659

 PS:

1 Elio Di Rupo 423,965 2 Paul Magnette 155,166 3 Marie Arena 139,774 4 Laurette Onkelinx 116,793 5 Willy Demeyer 115,439 6 Jean-Claude Marcourt 111,714 7 Rudy Demotte 93,377 8 Paul Furlan 80,529 9 André Flahaut 77,750 10 Frédéric Daerden 77,189

VLD:

1	Maggie De Block	340,846
2	Guy Verhofstadt	274,224
3	Alexander De Croo	199,722
4	Gwendolyn Rutten	167,117
5	Mathias De Clercq	151,654
6	Annemie Turtelboom	128,380
7	Vincent Van Quickenborne	112,711
8	Bart Somers	109,608
9	Patrick Dewael	93,829
10	Marino Keulen	86,227

sp.a:

1	Johan Vande Lanotte	186,177
2	Freya Van den Bossche	124,570
3	John Crombez	120,179
4	Peter Vanvelthoven	111,481
5	Bruno Tobback	106,585
6	Caroline Gennez	105,401
7	Ingrid Lieten	100,854
8	Monica De Coninck	97,712
9	Kathleen Van Brempt	94,992
10	Karin Temmerman	83,547

Deze cijfers zijn interessant in het kader van eventuele komende voorzittersverkiezingen bij sp.a. Voorzitter Tobback is maar de vijfde sterkste figuur in de eigen partij, zowaar op de hielen gezeten door zijn voorgangster Gennez. Afgezien van de hele sterke score van Vande Lanotte, liggen de anderen, van Van Brempt tot Van den Bossche, relatief in balans. Een voorzittersverkiezing zou de kans moeten zijn voor één van de figuren van plaatsen twee tot negen, om zich los te maken uit het peloton en de leiding te nemen van de generatie. Opnieuw een consensusverkiezing houden, zoals ongeveer alle voorgaande keren, hetzij een kansloze kandidaat à la Erik De Bruyn versus een "kandidaat van de top", lijkt geen goed idee. Een voorzittersverkiezing zou een nieuwe legitimiteit moeten brengen. Idealiter zijn alle figuren van plaatsen twee tot en met negen kandidaat. Bovendien kunnen ze ook hun onderlinge inhoudelijke verschillen tonen, en door een openbaar debat de partij aantrekkelijker maken voor zowel insiders als het bredere publiek. Het interview met Bonte en Vanvelthoven in Knack van deze week suggereert dat er wel degelijk ongenoegen is over bijvoorbeeld de "defenestratie" van Vandenbroucke, of het inhoudelijk erg defensieve profiel. Welnu, in plaats van daar achteraf over te knorren in de pers, zou een interne verkiezing het ideale moment zijn om de partijleden in de discussie te betrekken en een authentiek enthousiasme los te maken voor wie als (inhoudelijk zowel als persoonlijk) winnaar uit het proces komt. De sp.a kan in dat opzicht nog wat leren van de democratische cultuur bij de Franse Parti Socialiste, waar tendenzen een vast gegeven zijn, die het debat voortdurend stimuleren.

cdH:

1	Benoît Lutgen	136,769
2	Melchior Wathelet	112,084
3	Maxime Prévôt	98,761
4	Catherine Fonck	81,375
5	Marie-Dominique Simonet	80,033
6	Joëlle Milquet	79,272
7	Josy Arens	70,226
8	Alfred Gadenne	60,049
9	Marie-Martine Schyns	58,186
10	Benoît Dispa	56,714